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Abstract
This paper develops a simple accounting framework that measures the eect of resource
misallocation on aggregate productivity. This framework is based on a multi-sector general
equilibrium model with sector-specic frictions in the form of taxes on sectoral factor inputs.
Our framework is exible for the assumption on preferences or aggregate production functions.
Moreover, this framework is consistent with that commonly used in productivity analysis. I
apply this framework to measure to what extent resource misallocation explains the dier-
ences in aggregate productivity across developed countries. I nd that resource misallocation
explains, on average, about 25% of the dierences in the measured aggregate productivity
among developed countries. I also provide methods to decompose the causes of the misalloca-
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1 Introduction
There are large disparities in incomes even across developed countries. Prescott (2002) reports that
there is approximately a 30% to 40% dierence in per capita income between highly developed
countries. He argues that the most important factor in this disparity is the dierence in the level
of aggregate total factor productivity (TFP).1 From this standpoint, many theoretical models have
been proposed that try to explain the dierence in aggregate TFP. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)
point out that many of these models can be characterized as the theory of resource misallocation.
This theory states that frictions due to various reasons prevent the ecient use of resources,
resulting in a low aggregate TFP. Then, to what extent does resource misallocation actually aect
aggregate TFP and explain the dierence in aggregate TFP across countries?
To answer these problems, this paper proposes a simple accounting framework that measures
the eect of resource misallocation on aggregate TFP from data. This framework is based on a
multi-sector general equilibrium model with sector-specic frictions in the form of taxes on sectoral
factor inputs (capital and labor). As in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) and Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008), the sector-specic frictions in the form of taxes of each rm or sector reect
the various kinds of frictions the rm or sector faces. As in Chari et al. (2002), using the model,
I can measure these sector-specic frictions using the model from data (they are measured from
the dierences in factor input returns between sectors) and assess the eect of these frictions on
aggregate TFP. A characteristic of their tax (or wedge) approach is that it can deal with various
kinds of frictions that distort resource allocation all together.
Compared with other papers cited below that measure the eect of resource misallocation on
aggregate TFP, there are two characteristics in this paper's framework. First, our framework is
exible for the assumption on preferences or aggregate production functions. Especially, when we
measure the contribution of resource misallocation to the dierence in measured aggregate TFP, we
do not need to assume a specic form of preferences or aggregate production functions.2 Second,
this paper's framework is consistent with that commonly used in productivity analysis.
I apply this framework to the sectoral data of countries that are included in the EU KLEMS
1Parente and Prescott (2000) argue that the most important factor for the income disparities between developed
and developing countries is also the dierence in aggregate TFP.
2When conducting a counterfactual exercise, our framework implicitly or explicitly needs assumptions on pref-
erences or aggregate production functions to know how sectoral shares change in the counterfactual case.
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database.3 I nd that, on average, about 25% of the dierences in the measured aggregate TFP
between the U.S. and other countries is due to sector-level resource misallocation. The agricultural,
transport, and nancial sectors are primary sources of capital misallocation, while the agricultural
and nancial sectors are primary sources of labor misallocation. I also nd that the dierences in
sectoral shares (in other words, sectoral sizes) between countries, which can be driven by struc-
tural transformation, magnify the eect of sector-level resource misallocation on the dierence in
measured aggregate TFP.
Several papers measure resource misallocation from cross-sectional dierences in factor input
returns and calculate the resource misallocation eect on aggregate TFP using the general equi-
librium framework. This paper ts into this literature. To the best of my knowledge, the earliest
work in this eld is de Melo (1977). A computable multi-sector general equilibrium model is ap-
plied to the Colombian economy by de Melo (1977) to calculate the eect of removing distortions
on sector-level resource allocation. Recently, Restuccia, Yang and Zhu (2008) and Vollrath (2008)
use a two-sector model to measure the magnitude of barriers to resource allocation between the
old agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Using a standard model of monopolistic competi-
tion with heterogeneous rms and manufacturing plant-level data from China, India, and the U.S.,
Hsieh and Klenow (2007) estimate how resource misallocation aects aggregate TFP. As mentioned
above, compared with these papers, our framework is exible for the assumption on preferences
or aggregate production functions.4 Moreover, our framework is compatible with the framework
commonly used in productivity analysis. Finally, using this paper's framework (to be precise, the
framework of the previous version of this paper, Aoki, 2006), Miyagawa, Fukao, Hamagata and
Takizawa (2008) measure the eect of sector-level resource misallocation on the Japanese aggregate
TFP from the Japanese Industrial Productivity (JIP) Database.
Literature on productivity analysis has measured the eect of change on sectoral reallocation
on aggregate TFP growth (see Syrquin, 1986, and Basu and Fernald, 2002, among others). I show
that this paper's decomposition is a generalization of theirs; while their studies measure the eect
of resource misallocation on the aggregate TFP growth rate over time, this paper's framework
can also measure the eect on the level of aggregate TFP and on the cross-country dierence in
3The countries are Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S.
4On the other hand, for example, Restuccia et al. (2008) assume the Stone-Geary utility function, and Vollrath
(2008) assumes a small open economy, which is equivalent to assuming that goods are a perfect substitute.
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aggregate TFP. This paper also provides the micro-foundations for the reallocation eect. Owing
to this, the approach used herein can further decompose the causes of resource misallocation.
Several studies provide examples of resource misallocation. Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap
(2008) argue that during the Japanese stagnation of the 1990s, the forbearance lending of banks
shifted resources from healthy rms to zombie rms and zombie-dominated sectors. Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) argue that the dierences in the degree of borrowing constraint between rms can
shift resources from high-productivity rms to low-productivity rms. Hayashi and Prescott (2008)
argue that, for institutional reasons, there was a barrier to labor mobility between the agricultural
and non-agricultural sectors in prewar Japan. Frictions in the form of taxes in my model capture
the eect of these distortions on resource allocation.
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. Section 2 sets up and analyzes
a static multi-sector general equilibrium model with frictions in the form of sector-specic taxes
on factor inputs. Using the model, Section 3 develops methods to measure the eects of resource
misallocation on aggregate TFP. Using the developed framework, Section 4 measures the eect of
sector-level resource misallocation on aggregate TFP from data. Section 5 contains the concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
In this section, I develop a multi-sector competitive equilibrium model with sector-specic frictions.
In keeping with Chari et al. (2002), sector-specic frictions are modeled in the form of taxes on
sectoral factor inputs, the rms are price-takers and pay linear taxes on capital and labor, and
each rm's problem is static. I argue in Appendix A that several types of frictions in each sector
are isomorphic to taxes on this sector's factor inputs.5
2.1 I Industrial sectors
There are I industrial sectors in the economy. Firms in each sector produce goods (homogeneous
within a sector but heterogeneous between sectors) by using two factor inputs: capital K and
labor L (hereafter, J denotes factor input in general). Firms are price-takers in both the goods
5The term \isomorphic" means that the same allocation is achieved.
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and factor markets, and pay linear taxes on capital and labor inputs, which vary by sectors. Thus,
rms in sector i produce goods given the goods price of the sector, pi and capital and labor costs,
(1 + Ki)pK and (1 + Li)pL where Ki and Li are the capital and labor taxes of the sector, and
pK and pL are the common factor prices of capital and labor across sectors. Due to each sector
producing dierent goods, the goods price pi can vary across sectors in equilibrium (even if there
are no taxes). On the other hand, because capital and labor are homogeneous across sectors, if
Ki = 0 and Li = 0, the factor costs incurred by rms become the same. Because rms are
price-takers and assuming a rm's production function to be a constant-returns-to-scale, a rm
corresponds to a sector, and I thus identify a sector with a rm below.
The rms have Cobb-Douglas production technology exhibiting constant returns to scale.
Therefore, a rm i's production function can be written as follows:
Vi = Fi(Ki; Li)  AiKii L1 ii ; (1)
where Vi is the output, Ki is the capital input, Li is the labor input, and Ai is the productivity of
the rm. I assume that the capital intensity i can vary by sector.
In this setting, the rm's problem is written as
max
Ki;Li
piFi(Ki; Li)  (1 + Ki)pKKi   (1 + Li)pLLi:
The rst-order conditions (FOCs) are as follows:6
ipiVi
Ki
= (1 + Ki)pK ; (2)
(1  i)piVi
Li
= (1 + Li)pL: (3)
If a rm's prot is negative for any positive Ki and Li, the rm chooses not to produce, and the
above FOCs do not hold. Although hereafter I assume that the above FOCs hold for all sectors,
the results used in the later sections, i.e., (9){(12) hold even when some sectors do not produce.
6Note that from the FOCs, we also attain the unit cost function:
pi =
1

i
i (1  i)1 i
f(1 + Ki)pKgif(1 + Li)pLg1 i
Ai
:
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2.2 Aggregator function
I assume the constant returns to scale (CRS) aggregator function:
V = V (V1; : : : ; VI): (4)
I also assume that the following condition is satised:
@V
@Vi
= pi: (5)
This condition is satised if V is an aggregate good and rms that produce V from Vis are com-
petitive, or if V is the household's utility and the household chooses Vis to maximize V . Under
these conditions, the following equation holds7:
V =
X
i
piVi: (6)
2.3 Resource constraints
Finally, I assume that the aggregate capital and labor supply are exogenous. Thus, the following
resource constraints apply:
X
i
Ki = K; (7)X
i
Li = L; (8)
where K and L are the aggregate capital and labor supply.
2.4 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium of this economy is dened in the following way.
Denition. Given the productivities and taxes of I goods sectors fAi; 1 + Ki; 1 + Lig, and the
aggregate capital and labor K and L, a competitive equilibrium is a set of the output, capital,
7I normalize the aggregate good price to unity.
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labor, and prices of I goods sectors fVi;Ki; Li; pig, the aggregate value V , and common factor
prices pK and pL that satisfy the following conditions:
1. FOCs of rms in I goods sectors (2) and (3),
2. CRS assumption and marginal conditions (4) and (5),
3. Resource constraints (7) and (8).
In what follows, I derive the expressions for Ki and Li. Using (2) and (7), Ki can be rewritten
as follows:
Ki =
(1+Ki)pKKi
(1+Ki)pKP
j
(1+Kj)pKKj
(1+Kj)pK
K
=
piYii
1
(1+Ki)pKP
j pjYjj
1
(1+Kj)pK
K
=
~ii 11+KiP
j ~jj
1
1+Kj
K;
where ~i is the sectoral share piVi=V .8 This equation is rearranged as follows:
Ki =
~ii
~
~KiK; (9)
where ~ is the weighted average of capital intensities
P
i ~ii and ~Ki is the term composed of
frictions.9 ~Ki is dened as
~Ki  KiP
j

~jj
~

Kj
; and Ki  11 + Ki : (10)
In the same way, we obtain the equilibrium allocation of Li:
Li =
~i(1  i)
1  ~
~LiL; (11)
8I add a tilde~for the variables that depend on the functional form of V .
9Hsieh and Klenow (2007) also derive a similar expression.
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where
~Li  LiP
j

~j(1 j)
1 ~

Lj
; and Li  11 + Li : (12)
Equations (9){(12) uncover several ndings on the eect of taxes on the resource allocation
of capital and labor. First, from (9) and (11), we nd that taxes mainly aect the allocation
of resources through ~Ji although taxes can also aect ~i. Second, from (10) and (12), we nd
that ~Ji is the ratio of the reciprocal of sector i's return on the factor input and the mean of
the reciprocals of the returns across sectors. Due to this property, the absolute magnitude of the
taxes does not aect the resource allocation between sectors. For instance, if the tax on capital is
identical across sectors, then ~Ki becomes unity and is equal to the value with no frictions. On
the other hand, the distribution of taxes across sectors aects resource allocation. For example, if
Ki is smaller than the weighted average of Kj (i.e., sector i's capital is taxed more) and if ~is
do not vary much, ~Ki becomes less than unity, and less capital is allocated to the sector i than
to the level with no frictions.
In the empirical section, I do not measure frictions Jis themselves, but measure ~Jis, which
capture the distribution of frictions. ~Jis are measured using the following equations that are
rewritten from (9) and (11):
~Ki =

~ii
~
 1
Ki
K
; and ~Li =

~i(1  i)
1  ~
 1
Li
L
: (13)
3 Analyzing the Eects of Resource Misallocation on Ag-
gregate TFP
In order to calculate the eects of resource misallocation on aggregate TFP, in this section, by
taking an approximation of aggregator function V , I decompose aggregate TFP into components
composed of sectoral TFPs, sectoral shares, and resource misallocation. I provide an interpretation
of the decomposition. This section also provides a method to identify which sector contributes to
resource misallocation. Since the component of resource misallocation consists of the combination
of sectoral frictions and sectoral shares, I also provide a method to identify the contribution of
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these factors.
3.1 Decomposition of aggregate TFP
In order to analyze the eect of resource misallocation on aggregate TFP, I compare the aggregator
function at state S, V S , with that at state T , V T and apply the mean value theorem (hereafter,
the variables with superscript S denoting those at state S such as V S). State S, for example,
corresponds to Japan, while state T corresponds to the U.S. I assume that the capital intensity of
each sector i is the same across dierent states.
By applying the mean value theorem and using (5) and (6), we obtain
ln

V S
V T

=
X
i
@ lnV
@ lnVi
ln

V Si
V Ti

'
X
i
i ln

V Si
V Ti

;
where i  (~Si + ~Ti )=2.10 The RHS is the Tornqvist index of the value added dierence. By
substituting (1), (9), and (11) into the above equation, we obtain the following decomposition:
X
i
i ln

V Si
V Ti

=
X
i
i ln

ASi
ATi

+
X
i
i ln
 
~Si
~Ti
,
(~S)i(1  ~S)1 i
(~T )i(1  ~T )1 i
!
+
X
i
i
(
i ln
 
~SKi
~TKi
!
+ (1  i) ln
 
~SLi
~TLi
!)
+ ln

KS
KT

+ (1  ) ln

LS
LT

; (14)
where  Pi ii.
10In order to derive the rst equality, I dene (x) as follows:
(x)  lnV (expfx lnV S1 + (1  x) lnV T1 g; : : : ; expfx lnV SI + (1  x) lnV TI g); 0  x  1;
and apply the mean value theorem in the following way:
(1)  (0) = 0()(1  0);
where 0    1.
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I dene the aggregate TFP of state S relative to state T and refer to it as ATFP as follows:
ATFP 
X
i
i ln

V Si
V Ti

   ln

KS
KT

  (1  ) ln

LS
LT

: (15)
This is the standard denition of aggregate TFP.11 By rewriting (14) using the denition of ag-
gregate TFP, I obtain
ATFP '
X
i
i ln

ASi
ATi

+
X
i
i ln
 
~Si
~Ti
,
(~S)i(1  ~S)1 i
(~T )i(1  ~T )1 i
!
+
X
i
i
(
i ln
 
~SKi
~TKi
!
+ (1  i) ln
 
~SLi
~TLi
!)
: (16)
I refer to the rst term of the RHS in (16) as the sectoral TFP (STFP) term. STFP is a weighted
average of sectoral TFPs and is the same as the Domar (1961) weighted aggregate TFP. I refer
to the second term as the sectoral share (SS) term. This term mainly consists of sectoral shares.
Theoretically, when the dierences in ~is between states S and T are small, SS is approximately
zero (for the proof, see Appendix B). In addition, as reported in Section 4, SS is negligible in our
data. I refer to the third term as the allocational eciency (AE) term. It is the term on resource
misallocation because it consists of ~is that, as can be seen from (9) and (11), distort resource
allocation. When the friction level is identical across the sectors for each state (i.e., Si = 
S
j and
Ti = 
T
j ), AE becomes zero.
3.2 Interpretation of the decomposition
The decomposition in (16) can be used to measure how much of themeasured dierence in aggregate
TFP between two actual states is due to the dierences in sectoral TFPs measured by STFP and
due to the dierence in the distribution of sectoral frictions measured by AE. When used in this
way, this paper's decomposition can be considered as an extension of that by Syrquin (1986) and
Basu and Fernald (2002): we can show that when S corresponds to period t and T corresponds to
period t   1, SS + AE is equal to their reallocation term. Compared with theirs, our framework
enables further decompositions of AE in several dierent ways. For example, AE in (16) can be
decomposed into a state S frictions component that consists of ~SKi and ~
S
Li and a state T frictions
11See Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973) and Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982).
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component that consists of ~TKi and ~
T
Li. AE can also be decomposed into a capital frictions
component that consists of ~SKi and ~
T
Ki and a labor frictions component that consists of ~
S
Li and
~TLi. In a later section, I explain how to decompose AE into sectoral contributions.
This decomposition can also be used to measure how aggregate TFP would change when fric-
tions counterfactually disappear under certain conditions. Miyagawa et al. (2008), applying the
framework of this paper, calculate this eect under the conditions that state S corresponds to an
actual state and state T corresponds to a no-frictions state, and that sectoral TFPs and sectoral
shares of state T are the same as those of state S, and that ~TJi = 1.
We can also reinterpret the measured AE or SS + AE between two actual states from this
viewpoint: the negative of the AE (SS+AE) between two actual states measures how the dierence
in aggregate TFP between the two states would change when frictions counterfactually disappear
at both states, under the condition that the dierences in sectoral shares ~is between states S and
T are due to factors other than the dierences in sectoral frictions between the states (due to the
dierences in sectoral frictions).
To show this, rst, let us consider the case where the dierences in sectoral shares ~is between
states S and T are due to factors other than the dierences in sectoral frictions i between the
states. In this case, when frictions disappear for both states, AE becomes zero while STFP and SS
remain the same as before because sectoral frictions does not aect ~is (and sectoral TFPs). Then,
ATFP without friction is equal to STFP+SS, while ATFP with frictions is equal to STFP+SS+AE.
The misallocation eect is equal to the dierence between these two ATFPs, i.e.,  AE.
Next, let us consider another case in which the dierences in sectoral shares ~is between states
S and T are due to the dierences in sectoral frictions i between the states. In this case, when
the frictions at state S become those at state T , ~i, ~, and ~i become the same as those at state
T . Then, the change in aggregate TFP is equal to  (SS + AE). It is also equal to the change in
aggregate TFP when the frictions at both states are eliminated.
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3.3 Contribution of each sector to AE
An advantage of our framework is that it can identify which sector's frictions are the cause of
the dierence in aggregate TFP. This section provides the method.12 In order to identify the
contribution of the frictions of a particular sector (I refer to it as sector i), I calculate a ctitious
AE under the following assumptions (while I drop out superscripts S and T for convenience, note
that these assumptions are applied to both states). For both states, I x factor inputs of sector
i to its actual observed values and reallocate eciently the remaining factor inputs across the
remaining sectors of the economy. Then, the only source of distortion would be in sector i. For
simplicity, I also assume that sectoral shares ~is are xed. I refer to the AE calculated under this
assumption as AEi.
AEi is measured as follows (here, I divide AEi into capital and labor components). First, from
(9) and (11), sector i's ~Ji is the same as the actual one under the above assumption. Second,
since factor prices are the same across the remaining sectors, ~Jm = ~Jn = ~J i for the remaining
sectors under the above assumption (m and n are sectors that are not sector i, and I summarize
these sectors by  i). By rearranging
K i  K  Ki =
X
m6=i
Km =
X
m6=i
~mm
~
~K iK (17)
(note that K, Ki, and thus K i here are the same as the actual ones), we obtain
~K i =

~ i i
~
 1
K i
K
; (18)
where ~ i  1   ~i and  i 
P
m6=i(~m=(1   ~i))m (i.e.,  i is a weighted average of am
(m 6= i)). Then, the capital component of AEi, capital AEi, is calculated as follows:
capital AEi = ii ln
 
~SKi
~TKi
!
+  i i
 
~SK i
~TK i
!
; (19)
12I do not simply decompose AE in (16) into sectoral components. The reason is as follows. From (9) and (11),
we nd that the (absolute) distance of ~Ji from unity represents the magnitude of distortion. However, a simple
decomposition of AE in (16) by the sectors does not capture this characteristic. Suppose that ~SKi >
~TKi = 1.
Then, although the state S's allocation of capital in sector i is distorted while the state T 's is not, a simple sectoral
decomposition of capital AE, ii ln(~
S
Ki=
~TKi), becomes positive (it then says that the sector's friction has a
positive eect on ATFP and contradicts with the characteristics of distortion).
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where  i  1   i and  i 
P
m6=i(m=(1   i))m (i.e.,  i is a weighted average of am
(m 6= i)). In the same way, labor AEi is calculated by
labor AEi = i(1  i) ln
 
~SLi
~TLi
!
+  i(1   i)
 
~SL i
~TL i
!
; (20)
where ~L i is measured by
~L i =

~ i(1   i)
1  ~
 1
L i
L
; (21)
where L i  L  Li.
As is obvious from (19) and (20), AEi is equal to the AE when there are only two sectors: sector
i and all the rest. I show in Appendix C that the sum of AEi calculated as above is approximately
equal to actual AE.13
3.4 Contribution of sectoral frictions and sectoral shares to AE
AE depends on not only dierences in sectoral frictions Jis across states but also dierences in
sectoral shares ~is, because ~Ji depends on both factors. This section illustrates why the distinction
between both factors is important and provides a method for identifying how much is due to each
factor.
To understand how important dierences in ~is across states are on AE, suppose a two-sector
example, in which there are an agricultural sector A and a non-agricultural sector N and i = 0
for these sectors. Further suppose that the Lis are the same between state S and state T , but
the ~is are dierent between the states. Then, AE is calculated as
AE = A ln
 
~SLA
~TLA
!
+ N ln
 
~SLN
~TLN
!
= ln
 
~TALA + ~
T
NLN
  ln  ~SALA + ~SNLN :
Now further assume that ~SA > ~
T
A and LA > LN . The former assumption is reasonable when T
is a more mature economy than S. The latter is also reasonable because, in data, LA is higher
13They are also close in our data.
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than the average of all sectors.14 AE then becomes negative, irrespective of the same friction Lis.
In this case, the dierences in ~is generate the eect of sector-level resource misallocation on the
dierence in aggregate TFP.
In order to identify how much is due to sectoral shares, I calculate a counterfactual AE using
~Ji(f~Sj ; TJjg) instead of ~SJi, where ~Ji(f~Sj ; TJjg) is calculated from the sectoral shares of state
S, ~Sj s and the sectoral frictions of state T , 
T
Jjs as follows (the state T part remains the same as
the original AE):
~Ki(f~Sj ; TKjg) 
TKiP
j

~Sj j
~S

TKj
; ~Li(f~Sj ; TLjg) 
TLiP
j

~Sj (1 j)
1 ~S

TLj
:
I refer to the AE calculated using these frictions as the counterfactual AE. If the magnitude of
AE is large because of dierences in ~is between countries, the counterfactual AE will be close to
the AE calculated using ~SJis. If the results are due to dierences in ~Jis between countries, the
counterfactual AE will be small in magnitude.
In the empirical section, ~Ki(f~Sj ; TKjg) is measured from
~Ki(f~Sj ; TKjg) =
~TKiP
j

~Sj j
~S

~TKj
; (22)
because the denominator of the ~TKj (i.e.,
P
m(~
T
mm=~
T )TKm) is canceled out and 
T
Kjs show
up in the RHS of the numerator and denominator of (22). In the same way, ~Li(f~Sj ; TLjg) is
measured from
~Li(f~Sj ; TLjg) =
~TLiP
j

~Sj (1 j)
1 ~S

~TLj
: (23)
4 Empirical Results
In this section, using the framework developed in the previous sections and the sectoral data of
countries that are included in the EU KLEMS database, I calculate the contribution of sector-
level resource misallocation to cross-country dierences in aggregate TFP. After measuring the
14We can conrm it in Figure 2.
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distribution of sector-level frictions from the data, I calculate sectoral share (SS), allocational
eciency (AE), and aggregate TFP (ATFP) between the U.S. and other countries (state T in the
model corresponds to the U.S. and state S corresponds to other EU KLEMS countries). I also
identify which sector is the cause of the resource misallocation and whether the results come from
the dierences in sectoral shares across countries or not. Since I impose an assumption that i is
the same across countries, I also check its robustness.
4.1 Measurement procedure
We can measure allocational eciency by measuring ~Jis, ~J is, ~Ji(f~Sj ; TJjg)s, is, and ~is.
~Jis can be measured from (13) because Ki, K, Li, and L are available from the data, and ~i
and i can be measured as discussed below. Measuring ~Jis in this way would capture several kinds
of distortions that aect cross-sectional, sector-level resource allocation such as those in Appendix
A. In the same way, ~J is and ~Ji(f~Sj ; TJjg)s are measured from (18), (21), (22), and (23).
I use i that is measured from the U.S. data, under the assumption that good market imperfec-
tions are weak in the U.S., and that the i of a given sector is the same across developed countries
for the reasons explained below. For the robustness check, in Section 4.6, I also measure AE where
i is measured from each country's data.
The reason I do not use is in each country is because the measured is can be biased if there
are market imperfections. Since the taxes in our model do not correspond to those in the tax data,
we cannot measure an unbiased i by simply using FOCs in (2) and (3). Thus, we have to deal
with the same diculties in measuring capital intensity as has been discussed in previous studies.
First, it is known that if there are imperfections in the goods market, i measured from revenue
share can have biases (for details, see Basu and Fernald, 2002). On the other hand, if there are
imperfections in the factor markets, the i measured from the factor input costs can have biases
(for details, see Appendix A.4).
The ~is can be measured from the sectoral nominal shares, which is consistent with the model's
assumption.
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4.2 Data
I use the annual sectoral data of the EU KLEMS database for Australia, Austria, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, the U.K.,
and the U.S. for 1985, 1995, and 2005 (for the Czech Republic, Germany, Portugal, and Sweden,
for 1995 and 2005 due to data availability).15 The sectors considered in this study include (1)
\Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing" (hereafter, the agricultural sector), (2) \Mining and
Quarrying" and \Total Manufacturing" (the manufacturing sector), (3) \Electricity, Gas andWater
Supply" (the electricity sector), (4) \Construction" (the construction sector), (5) \Wholesale and
Retail Trade" and \Hotels and Restaurants" (the wholesale sector), (6) \Transport and Storage
and Communication" (the transport sector), and (7) \Financial Intermediation" (the nancial
sector).
We need data on sectoral capital inputs Ki, sectoral labor inputs Li, sectoral capital intensities
is, and sectoral shares ~is, in order to measure SS and AE. For Ki, I use \real xed capital
stock, 1995 prices" of \all assets" in the database. For Li, I use \total hours worked by per-
sons engaged." The is are measured as the \capital compensation"=(\capital compensation" +
\labor compensation") of the U.S. (they are the averages of the years from 1977 to 2005). The ~is
are measured from the nominal value added (\gross value added at current basic prices") share of
each country and each period.
In order to measure ATFP, we need the PPP-adjusted sectoral output V PPPi , and the sectoral
capital KPPPi . The PPP-adjusted sectoral output at year t, V
PPP
it is obtained as the nominal value
added  price-adjustment rate, where the price-adjustment rate is calculated as the ination rate
 PPP conversion rate, (P ci1997=P cit)(PPPU:S:i1997=PPPci1997) (P cit is the \gross output, price indices"
of country c at year t, and PPPci1997 is the PPP rate of country c at 1997).16 The PPP-adjusted
sectoral capital KPPPi is calculated in a similar way, except that we use the same values across
the sectors for the ination rate and the PPP conversion rate of KPPPi to be consistent with the
model (in the model, capital is homogeneous), and they are the sectoral weighted average of the
P ci1997=P
c
it and PPP
U:S:
i1997=PPP
c
i1997 used above, weighted by the average of the nominal value added
15They are the countries that provide output, capital, and labor data. For the U.S., I use \United States-NAICS
based" data. Moreover, as for the data used for the measurement of is, I use U.S. data from 1977 to 2005.
16I do not use the deator for gross value added but use the deator for gross output because the available data
on the PPP rate are those for the gross output.
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shares (i.e., ~is) between periods or countries.17
For reference, I report the measured ~Ki and ~L in Figures 1 and 2 (the values are the averages
of the years for each country and each sector). The higher the sectoral return on capital or labor
compared with other sectors of the same country, the lower the measured ~Ki or ~Li.
4.3 SS, AE, and the contribution to ATFP
Using (15) and (16), I calculate the sectoral share (SS), allocational eciency (AE), and aggregate
TFP (ATFP) between the U.S. and other EU KLEMS countries. Note that the state S in the
equations corresponds to the countries except for the U.S. while the state T corresponds to the
U.S. Table 1 reports the years' averages of these results. For reference, in Table 2, I also report
the decomposition of AE by each country and U.S. components and that by capital and labor
components in the way discussed in Section 3.2.
The rst column in Table 1 reports the sectoral share (SS). We nd that for all countries, SS is
small and close to zero. The second column reports the allocational eciency (AE). For example,
the result on AE for Japan implies that the aggregate TFP of Japan compared with that of the
U.S. becomes 9:6% lower because of sector-level resource misallocation (see also the discussion in
Section 3.2). The third column calculates the dierences in aggregate TFP (ATFP) between the
U.S. and other countries.
The importance of resource misallocation for the dierence in aggregate TFP can be measured
by dividing AE by ATFP. The results are shown in the fourth column in Table 1. The results
range from 0:9% for the U.K. to 63:3% for the Netherlands. The average of the numbers across
countries is 25:7%. It implies that, on average, 25:7% of the dierences in aggregate TFP between
the U.S. and other countries is explained by resource misallocation. The correlation between AE
and ATFP in the table is also high (0.49). These results suggest that the sector-level resource
misallocation is an important factor of cross-country dierences in aggregate TFP between these
developed countries.
17Here, I implicitly assume that capital is made from aggregate value added.
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4.4 Contribution of each sector to AE
Using the result in Section 3.3, this section analyzes which sector contributes to AE. Figures 3 and
4 report capital and labor AEis calculated using equations (18){(21).
Figure 3 reports that for these countries, the agricultural, transport, and nancial sectors are
the sectors where the magnitude of capital AEi is large and thus implies that these sectors are the
causes of resource misallocation of capital. This is because the return on capital is low (i.e., ~Ki is
high) in the agricultural and transport sectors, while the return on capital is high (i.e., ~Ki is low)
in the nancial sector (see Figure 1). On the other hand, Figure 4 suggests that the agricultural
and nancial sectors are the causes of labor misallocation. As in capital AEi, this is because the
return on labor is low (i.e., ~Li is high) in the agricultural sector, while the return on labor is high
(i.e., ~Li is low) in the nancial sector (see Figure 2).
4.5 Contribution of sectoral frictions and sectoral shares to AE
As argued in Section 3.4, the AE results depend on the dierences in sectoral frictions and the
dierences in sectoral shares across countries. The interpretation of the results in the previous
sections diers depending on which is really the cause of the AE. If the former is the cause,
the dierences in sectoral frictions between countries are a cause of the dierences in aggregate
TFP between countries. On the other hand, if the latter is the cause, other mechanisms that
aect sectoral shares generate the eect of sector-level resource misallocation on the dierences in
aggregate TFP. Here, in order to identify this problem, I calculate the counterfactual AE discussed
in Section 3.4.
The rst column in Table 3 reports the counterfactual AE for each country. The magnitude
of the counterfactual AE is not small. In order to see the magnitude, I calculate the ratio of the
counterfactual AE and the original AE in the second column of Table 3. The ratio varies from 13%
for Japan to nearly 100% for the Czech Republic. The result implies that most of the measured
misallocation for Japan is due to the dierences in sectoral frictions between Japan and the U.S.
On the other hand, most of the misallocation eect for the Czech Republic is due to the dierences
in sectoral shares between the Czech Republic and the U.S.
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4.6 Capital intensity i
I measure is from the U.S. data, under the assumption that the is are the same across developed
countries. For the robustness check, I also calculate the cross-country AE for the case where the
is are measured from each country for each year.18 I report the results in the third column in
Table 3. We can conrm that the results are similar to the AE in Table 1.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I proposed a simple multi-sector accounting framework to measure the eect of
resource misallocation on aggregate productivity. The characteristics of this framework are that it is
micro-founded, is exible for the assumption on preferences or aggregate production functions, and
is consistent with the framework commonly used in productivity analysis. Using this framework,
I measured to what extent resource misallocation explains the dierence in aggregate TFP across
developed countries. I found that sector-level resource misallocation accounted for, on average,
25% of the dierences in aggregate TFP among developed countries. I also provided methods to
identify the causes of the resource misallocation.
There are some limitations in this paper's analysis. The rst involves the interpretation of cross-
sectional dierences in returns on factor inputs. In this paper, cross-sectional dierences in returns
are interpreted as distortions. However, other interpretations such as dierences in eciency wage
and quality of factor inputs (e.g., dierences in educational attainment) across sectors, and the
existence of investment adjustment costs are also possible. For the former two instances, some
of these eects might cancel each other out in cross-country analysis if the degree of these eects
is similar across countries. The eect in the last case might be inferred from the change in the
eect of measured frictions over a period of time. However, further improvements are needed in
these problems. Second, this paper does not take into account material inputs. If frictions on the
allocation of materials exist, the frictions can also aect aggregate productivity. Exploration of
18 AE expressed in (16) is modied as follows:
AE =
∑
i
i
{
Si ln
~SKi   Ti ln ~TKi
}
+
∑
i
i
{
(1  Si ) ln ~SLi   (1  Ti ) ln ~TLi
}
:
The years when i =2 [0; 1] is measured are eliminated from the calculation (this is the reason why the result for
Germany is not available).
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this issue is also left for future research.
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Appendix
A Examples of Sector-level or Firm-level Frictions
In the Section 2 model, the frictions that rms face appear as taxes imposed on their factor inputs,
rms are price-takers, and a rm's problem is static. In the following examples, following Chari
et al. (2002), I argue that the eect of several types of frictions in each sector is isomorphic to the
taxes on this sector's factor inputs in that the same allocation is achieved. Especially, in the last
example, the eect of frictions in a dynamic model is isomorphic to taxes in the static Section 2
model in terms of the current period allocation.
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As mentioned in Section 4.1, Appendix A.4 explains that i measured from factor input cost
can have biases for the following models.
A.1 Barrier to labor mobility
Hayashi and Prescott (2008) argue that a barrier to labor mobility from the agricultural sector to
the non-agricultural sector was one of the causes of stagnation in prewar Japan. I demonstrate
that the allocation of this model can be achieved in the Section 2 model.
First, let us consider a labor immobility model. Suppose that there are two sectors (the agricul-
tural sector A and the non-agricultural sector N). Firms in each sector are competitive. However,
there is a constraint on labor mobility between the sectors, in the form that labor input in sector
A, LA has to be at least LA (i.e., LA  LA). Notations of the model are basically the same as in
Section 2. Then, the typical rm's problem is
max
Ki;Li
piFi(Ki; Li)  pKKi   pLiLi; i 2 fA or Ng: (24)
The factor price on labor, pLi, can be dierent between the sectors, because of the constraint on
labor mobility:
pLA 6= pLN : (25)
Therefore, the allocation can dier from the no-friction case.
Suppose that other settings are the same as in Section 2. Then, if I set (1 + LA) = pLA,
(1 + LN ) = pLN , and (1 + Ki) = 1 in the Section 2 model, the eect of the barrier to labor
mobility is isomorphic to the taxes in the Section 2 model. For the proof, suppose that ~is in
Section 2 are the same as those in the above model. Then, from (9) and (11), the same Ki and Li
is achieved. Thus, the same Vi is achieved. In both models,
~i =
@V
@Vi
Vi
V
:
Since the RHS is the function of Vis, the supposition that the ~is are the same is right.
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A.2 Imperfect competition
I demonstrate that frictions caused by imperfect competition such as monopoly, oligopoly, or
monopolistic competition can also be expressed as taxes on factor inputs.
Let us consider the following rm's problem: the rm is a price-taker in the factor market but
a price-setter in the output market. Notations of the model are basically the same as in Section 2.
Accordingly, the rm's cost minimization problem is
min
Ki;Li
pKKi + pLLi; (26)
s:t: Vi = Fi(Ki; Li): (27)
The FOCs of the problem are
pi
@Fi(Ki; Li)
@Ki
=
pi
i
pK ; (28)
pi
@Fi(Ki; Li)
@Li
=
pi
i
pL; (29)
where i is the Lagrange multiplier and pi is the price of the good that the rm produces. Since
i is equal to the marginal cost, pi=i is the markup and is equal to unity when the rm is a
price-taker in the output market.
Suppose that the other settings are the same as in Section 2. Then, if I set (1 + Ki) =
(1 + Li) = pi=i in the Section 2 model, the eect of imperfection is isomorphic to the taxes in
the Section 2 model. The proof can be shown in the same way as in Section A.1.
A.3 Borrowing constraint
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that dierences in the degree of borrowing constraint between
rms can aect resource allocation and aggregate productivity. I demonstrate that the allocation
of this model at a certain period can be achieved in the Section 2 model.
First, let us consider a recursive borrowing constraint model under no uncertainty. Suppose a
typical rm i. The state of the rm is capital input Ki; 1 and borrowing Bi; 1. The rm chooses
labor input, Li, the new capital, Ki, and new borrowing Bi. The prices are constant for simplicity.
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Then, the rm's problem is written as follows:
Ji(Ki; 1; Bi; 1) = max
Ki;Li;Bi
i +mJi(Ki; Bi);
s:t: i = piFi(Ki; Li)  pLLi   qK(Ki   (1  )Ki; 1)
+
Bi
R
 Bi; 1;
Bi  iqK(1  )Ki; (30)
where m is the discount factor, R is the gross interest rate, qK is the price of capital (not the rental
price but the asset price),  is the depreciation rate, (30) is the rm's borrowing constraint in the
next period, and i is the rm's collateral constraint parameter. Other notations are the same as
in Section 2. This rm's problem is similar to that of Jermann and Quadrini (2006) except for the
timing of the investment and the formulation of the borrowing constraint. Then, the FOCs are
rearranged as follows:
pi
@Fi(Ki; Li)
@Ki
= qK  mqK(1  )  iiqK(1  ); (31)
pi
@Fi(Ki; Li)
@Li
= pL;
where i is the Lagrange multiplier of the rm's borrowing constraint and is zero when the con-
straint is not bound.
Suppose that other settings and aggregate capital and labor of the current period in the above
model are the same as in the Section 2 model. Then, if I set (1 + Ki) to be proportional to the
RHS of (31) and (1 + Li) = 1 in the Section 2 model, the eect of the borrowing constraint is
isomorphic to the taxes in the Section 2 model. The proof can be shown in the same way as in
Section A.1.
A.4 Biases arising in the measurement of i
Here, I argue that if there are imperfections in the factor market as in Appendices A.1 and A.3,
i measured from factor input cost can have biases.
To examine this, take the labor immobility model in Section A.1 as an example. In this model,
because rms are price-takers for factor markets, 1 i is equal to the cost share of the labor input.
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Because of the barrier to labor mobility, the labor input cost becomes dierent between sectors,
although the quality of labor input is homogeneous in the model. However, the labor input cost is
usually measured under the assumption that the cost of labor input with the same quality level is
the same between sectors. Thus, measured 1 i can have biases, if the labor input cost measured
in this way is used.19 A similar problem arises on the capital side in the case of the borrowing
constraint model in Section A.3.
B Value of SS When the Dierences in ~is Is Small
Here, I show that SS dened in Section 3.1 is approximately zero when the dierences in ~is
between the states S and T are small. When
P
i i = 1, the following relationship holds:
X
i
iln i '
X
i
i
i
i
= 1  1
= 0:
By setting i  ii= or i  i(1  i)=(1  ), we nd that

X
i
ii

ln

~ii
~

and (1  )
X
i
i(1  i)
1    ln

~i(1  i)
1  ~

are approximately zero ( denotes the dierence between states S and T ). Finally, SS is the sum
of these terms.
C Relation between AEi and AE
This appendix shows that if ~Si and ~
T
i are small for each sector, the sum of AEi is approximately
equal to AE. The sum of the capital AEi, AEKi, in (19) can be written as follows:
X
i
AEKi = AEK +
X
i
(  ii) ln
 
~SK i
~TK i
!
;
19In this case, 1  i measured from the revenue share does not have biases.
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where AEK is the capital component of AE (AEK 
P
i ii ln

~SKi=~
T
Ki

). We show that the
second term of the RHS of the above equation approximately becomes zero. Since we can show
for the labor component in the same way, we can show the statement of the appendix.
To show that the second term of the RHS of the above equation approximately becomes zero, I
further focus on the state S component (the same result applies to the state T component). Thus,
I show
X
i
(  ii) ln ~SK i ' 0; (32)
when ~Si and ~
T
i are small (note that i depends on ~
T
i ). From (18), we obtain the following
relationship:
~SK i = 1 +
1  ~SKi
~S
~Si i
  1
By substituting it in the LHS of (32) and rearranging, we obtain
(32) =
X
i

  ii
~S   ~Si i

~S
~Si i
  1

~Si i ln
0@1 + 1  ~SKi
~S
~Si i
  1
1A
=
X
i

  ii
~S   ~Si i

~Si i ln
0@1 + 1  ~SKi
~S
~Si i
  1
1A ~
S
~S
i
i
 1
:
For suciently small ~Si and ~
T
i ,

  ii
~S   ~Si i

' 
~S
; and
0@1 + 1  ~SKi
~S
~Si i
  1
1A ~
S
~S
i
i
 1
' exp

1  ~SKi

:
Thus, if ~Si and ~
T
i are small in all sectors,
(32) ' 
~S
X
i
~Si i

1  ~SKi

= 0:
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The last equation becomes zero, because
P
i ~
S
i i = ~
S and
P
i ~
S
i i
~SKi = ~
S from the denitions.
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SS AE ATFP AE=ATFP
Australia 0:2%  5:4%  30:0% 17:9%
Austria 0:0%  8:5%  37:5% 22:7%
Czech Republic  0:8%  5:8%  103:0% 5:6%
Denmark 0:2%  5:8%  16:0% 36:6%
Finland  0:2%  11:8%  24:0% 49:2%
Germany 0:0%  0:6%  12:2% 4:8%
Italy 0:0%  5:2%  33:9% 15:3%
Japan 0:0%  9:6%  53:9% 17:9%
Netherlands 0:1%  2:6%  4:0% 63:3%
Portugal 0:5%  16:6%  76:7% 21:7%
Sweden  0:1%  6:7%  12:8% 52:6%
U.K. 0:0%  0:2%  22:8% 0:9%
Average 25:7%
Table 1: Sectoral share (SS), allocational eciency (AE), aggregate TFP (ATFP), and AE divided
by ATFP (AE=ATFP) of the countries compared with the U.S. Notes: AE (or SS+AE) measures
the eect of resource misallocation on the dierence in aggregate TFP (ATFP) between other
countries and the U.S. AE=ATFP measures the extent to which the dierences in aggregate TFP
between the countries are explained by resource misallocation. \Average" in the last row is the
average of the countries. These values are the years' averages.
Each country U.S. Capital Labor
Australia  7:9% 2:5%  3:3%  2:1%
Austria  11:2% 2:7%  4:1%  4:5%
Czech Republic  7:4% 1:7%  4:4%  1:4%
Denmark  8:3% 2:4%  4:7%  1:1%
Finland  13:3% 1:5%  7:2%  4:6%
Germany  4:7% 4:2%  1:6% 1:0%
Italy  7:5% 2:3%  0:5%  4:6%
Japan  13:1% 3:4%  5:3%  4:4%
Netherlands  5:8% 3:2%  0:5%  2:1%
Portugal  18:4% 1:8%  3:5%  13:2%
Sweden  9:8% 3:1%  5:9%  0:9%
U.K.  4:1% 3:9%  0:3% 0:1%
Table 2: Two decompositions of AE. Notes: In the rst two columns, the AE in Table 1 is
decomposed into each country and U.S. components, and in the next two columns, the AE is
decomposed into capital and labor components. (In both cases, the sum of the components is
equal to the AE in Table 1.) These values are the years' averages.
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CFAE CFAE=AE AE with di is
Australia  3:9% 72:0%  6:1%
Austria  3:0% 35:2%  9:5%
Czech Republic  5:7% 97:9%  5:2%
Denmark  3:9% 66:6%  6:7%
Finland  5:5% 46:7%  7:2%
Germany  0:2% 32:6% n.a.
Italy  3:9% 74:7%  6:3%
Japan  1:3% 13:2%  11:0%
Netherlands  2:5% 95:7%  4:0%
Portugal  6:3% 37:7%  15:4%
Sweden  2:8% 41:6%  7:8%
U.K.  0:5% 240:9%  2:5%
Table 3: Counterfactual AEi (CFAE in the table), the ratio of CFAE and AE (CFAE=AE), and
AE with country-specic is (AE with di is). Notes: Counterfactual AE measures the eect
of resource misallocation on aggregate TFP when the frictions of each country are the same as
those of the U.S. but the sectoral shares are those of each country. AE with country-specic is
is calculated using is measured from each country for each year. These values are the years'
averages.
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Figure 1: Measured capital wedge, ~Ki for each country. Note: These values are the years' averages.
Figure 2: Measured labor wedge, ~Li for each country. Note: These values are the years' averages.
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Figure 3: Sectoral contribution of capital frictions, capital AEi. Notes: This capital AEi measures
the eect of sector i's capital frictions on aggregate TFP. These values are the years' averages.
Figure 4: Sectoral contribution of labor frictions, labor AEi. Notes: This labor AEi measures the
eect of sector i's labor frictions on aggregate TFP. These values are the years' averages.
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